The Suez Crisis
British paratroopers landing near the El Gamil Airfield during the Suez Conflict. From the National Army Museum, London.
On this day, 29 October 1956, Israeli troops invade the Sinai Peninsula and push towards the recently nationalised Suez Canal. Two days later they will be joined by the forces of Britain and France, two countries who had previously overseen the operation of the Canal as the majority shareholders of the Suez Canal Company, and who planned to use the conflict as a pretext to retake control under the guise of ‘restoring order’ in the region. The invasion comes after a failed diplomatic mission by Robert Menzies, who had led an international committee which sought to convince Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to allow an international body to continue to operate the Canal.
In the Cold War context of the 1950s, Egypt was a neutral country seeking to be wooed by both the West and the Soviets. Western powers America and Britain had promised crucial financial assistance to Egypt to fund the building of the Aswan High Dam project, but they withdrew this funding following Nasser’s recognition of the government of Communist China. Carried out in retaliation, the nationalisation would simultaneously assert Egyptian freedom of action, while also helping to fund the dam via canal tolls. Nasser declared that the nationalisation was the ‘answer to American and British conspiracies against Egypt’ and a response to ‘imperialistic efforts to thwart Egyptian independence’. To his critics, Nasser’s actions were in breach of international law, as he had illegally repudiated the 99-year concession that had been given to the Suez Canal Company for carrying out its construction.
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden reacted strongly to the nationalisation, fearful that the rogue Nasser might block Britain’s access to the Canal but perhaps even more concerned of the threat that Nasser’s success might pose to British prestige and authority. Under Dwight Eisenhower, America shared some of these concerns but unlike the British they were completely unwilling to countenance military intervention, and they insisted on the diplomatic approach that would culminate in Menzies’s mission.
Australia’s interests in the affair were threefold. On an economic level it faced important risks as 60% of its then European dominated trade was transported via the Canal and it relied on oil reserves from the region. On a defensive level Australia was concerned about the loss of British hard power, though to some degree Menzies had already accepted that British power was waning when he signed the ANZUS agreement in 1951. Above all there was the sentimental interest to see Britain maintain her leading place on the world stage at a time when Australians were still inclined to see themselves as British.
Menzies was naturally sympathetic towards the British perspective, and he was determined that Nasser should not ‘get away with such an act of brigandage’ that might undermine a rules based international order. Nevertheless, his direct involvement was a matter of circumstance as he happened to be in Washington and London at crucial times, and had a long standing friendship with Eden.
In September 1956 Menzies went to Egypt to try to convince Nasser to give the Canal over to an international body to be established by treaty and associated with the United Nations, a proposal developed by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Menzies hoped that the Canal could thus ‘continue to be an international waterway operated free of politics or national discrimination, and with financial structure so secure and an international confidence so high that an expanding and improving future for the Canal could be guaranteed’. This ‘national discrimination’ had already been evidenced by the fact that Egypt had barred Israel from using the waterway. Menzies was guilty of a lack of tact in some of his dealings with Nasser, but whatever success he might have achieved was undercut when Eisenhower made a public statement saying that the US would not support the use of force if negotiations broke down. Freed from the fear of significant consequences, Nasser inevitably rejected the proposal as a ‘derogation from Egyptian sovereignty’.
By taking on this role as the face of the delegation, Menzies put at stake his reputation, and to some extent Australia’s. Research has revealed that he acted with his heart over his head, ignoring policy advice and making decisions based on emotional attachment rather than long term strategic thinking. It did not help that at the time the Australian Government’s relationship with Britain was overseen by the Prime Minister’s Department, rather than the Department of External Affairs. Neither did it help that Menzies was distrustful of the External Affairs Department Secretary Arthur Tange as a man who was closely associated with Opposition Leader H.V. Evatt.
The invasion was successful militarily, but it provoked a stern response from the United States and the Soviet Union, who forced Britain and France to withdraw in humiliating fashion. Erstwhile a close ally of Britain, the United States threatened to sell off Sterling bonds in a manner that could have crashed the British economy. In the end Eden resigned as Prime Minister, and the loss of British prestige which the invasion had been designed to halt was if anything accelerated by the clear demonstration that British foreign policy could not hope to operate without regard for American opinion.
Menzies publicly backed the British course of action, unaware of the secret collusion with Israel contained in the Protocol of Sèvres. He was furious at Eisenhower, to whom he sent a provocative note that may have compromised Australia’s relationship with the United States were it not for the tactful intervention of External Affairs Minister Richard Casey. Unlike Eden, Menzies was able to politically recover from the damage Suez did to his reputation, but it was one of the most embarrassing episodes in his entire political career and he remained incredibly defensive about the issue when writing his memoir Afternoon Light.
Further Reading:
Robert Bowker, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia, Menzies and Suez: Australian Policymaking on the Middle East Before, During and After the Suez Crisis (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019).
A.W. Martin, Robert Menzies, A Life Volume 2 1944-1978 (Melbourne University Press, 1999).